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RULES 
There are no court rules at issue in this case. 
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L JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (2006). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court erred in failing to adequately consider the priority of 
existing claims against appellant's equitable interest in the marital property when 
determining to offset past due child support obligations against said equitable 
interest. 
1. Standard of Review 
The above stated issue involves a question of law, which the court reviews 
for correctness without deference to the trial court's determination. Brinkerhoff 
v. Brinkerhoff 945 P.2d 113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case. 
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated (2006): 
Section 57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchasers document is first duly recorded. 
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Section 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
Section 78-22-1 Duration of judgment — Judgment as a lien upon real 
property — Abstract of judgment — Small claims judgment not a lien — 
Appeal of judgment — Child support orders, 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law. 
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry 
of judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the 
existence of the judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is 
entered may be filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and 
effect as a judgment entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the 
small claims division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property 
unless abstracted to the civil division of the district court and recorded in 
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accordance with Subsection (3). 
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the 
notice of appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount considered 
sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the 
judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or 
costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal, the lien created by the 
judgment shall be terminated as provided in Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the 
court shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and 
granting the judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the 
date of the original judgment. 
(6) (a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support 
may be enforced: 
(i) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; or 
(ii) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a 
tribunal. 
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order. 
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration. 
(7) (a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice 
court in the state becomes a lien upon real property if: 
(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information 
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is 
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recorded in the office of the county recorder; or 
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information 
statement of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is 
recorded in the office of the county recorder. 
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice 
court. 
(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the 
judgment debtor: 
(i) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7)(a)(i) or (ii) 
occurs; and 
(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the 
judgment is effective. 
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection 
(7)(a). 
(8) (a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the 
name of the judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county 
recorder as required in Section 17-21-6. 
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the 
appropriate tract index in the office of the county recorder. 
Section 78-22-1.5. Definitions - Judgment recorded in Registry of 
Judgments. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments'1 means the index 
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where a judgment shall be filed and searchable by the name of the judgment 
debtor through electronic means or by tangible document. 
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not 
create a lien upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is filed in 
the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district court of the 
county in which the property is located. 
(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), a 
judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect the title to 
real property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment is recorded in the 
office of the county recorder in which the real property of the judgment debtor is 
located. 
(b) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection 
(3)(a). 
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3)(a), any judgment 
that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or any 
judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county recorder 
after July 1, 2002, shall include: 
(a) the information identifying the judgment debtor on the judgment or abstract 
of judgment; or 
(b) a copy of the separate information statement of the judgment creditor that 
contains: 
(i) the correct name and last-known address of each judgment debtor and the 
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address at which each judgment debtor received service of process; 
(ii) the name and address of the judgment creditor; 
(iii) the amount of the judgment as filed in the Registry of Judgments; 
(iv) if known, the judgment debtor's social security number, date of birth, and 
driver's license number if a natural person; and 
(v) whether or not a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and the 
date the stay expires. 
(5) For the information required in Subsection (4), the judgment creditor shall: 
(a) provide the information on the separate information statement if known or 
available to the judgment creditor from its records, its attorney's records, or the 
court records in the action in which the judgment was entered; or 
(b) state on the separate information statement that the information is unknown 
or unavailable. 
(6) (a) Any judgment that requires payment of money and is entered in a 
district court on or after September 1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of 
judgment recorded in the office of a county recorder after July 1, 2002, that does 
not include the debtor identifying information as required in Subsection (4) is not 
a lien until a separate information statement of the judgment creditor is recorded in 
the office of a county recorder in compliance with Subsections (4) and (5). 
(b) The separate information statement of the judgment creditor referred to in 
Subsection (6)(a) shall include: 
(i) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee; 
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(ii) the date of recording; and 
(iii) the entry number of the original judgment or abstract of judgment. 
(7) A judgment that requires payment of money recorded on or after September 
1, 1998, but prior to July 1, 2002, has as its priority the date of entry, except as to 
parties with actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment 
(8) A judgment or notice of judgment wrongfully filed against real property is 
subject to Title 38, Chapter 9, Wrongful Liens. 
Section 78-45-9.3. Payment under child support order — Judgment. 
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on the 1st day of each 
month for purposes of child support services pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Part 3, income withholding services pursuant to Part 4, and income withholding 
procedures pursuant to Part 5. 
(2) For purposes of child support services and income withholding pursuant to 
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3 and Part 4, child support is not considered past due 
until the 1st day of the following month. For purposes other than those specified in 
Subsection (1) support shall be payable 1/2 by the 5th day of each month and 1/2 
by the 20th day of that month, unless the order or decree provides for a different 
time for payment. 
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2, is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district 
court, except as provided in Subsection (4); 
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(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any other 
jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, 
except as provided in Subsection (4). 
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but 
only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the 
petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. If the tribunal orders 
that the support should be modified, the effective date of the modification shall be 
the month following service on the parent whose support is affected. Once the 
tribunal determines that a modification is appropriate, the tribunal shall order a 
judgment to be entered for any difference in the original order and the modified 
amount for the period from the service of the pleading until the final order of 
modification is entered. 
(5) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or 
other comparable domestic or foreign jurisdiction. 
(6) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to be effective and 
enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying on 
the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with 
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-312.5. 
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Section 78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently existing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any other 
rights. 
V. RULES PROVISION 
There are no rules court rules at issue in this case. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an Amended Decree of Divorce and an Order 
on Petitioner's Verified Motion for Contempt and For Order Appointing Clerk of 
Court to Release Trust Deed, both entered by the Third District Court on January 
12, 2006. The Amended Decree incorporates by reference Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made by the trial court on October 5, 2001, following a bench 
trial held June 29, 2001. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered March 
21, 1997. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 5, 2001 
("Findings"), Page 1, Par. 1. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the appellee was awarded custody of the 
parties' two minor children and a third child that the appellant had out of wedlock, 
subject to appellant's visitation rights. Findings, Page 2, Par. 2a. 
.3. The appellant was ordered to pay monthly child support of $ 184, one half 
of the children's medical insurance premium, one half of work-related daycare 
costs incurred by appellee, and to be equally responsible with appellee for all 
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medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, and prescription costs of the children not 
covered by medical insurance. Findings, Page 2, Par. 2b-2e. 
4. The appellant was awarded temporary alimony in the amount of $350 
month for two years, which would terminate under certain conditions, including if 
appellant cohabited. Findings, Page 3, Par. 2f. 
5. The appellee was awarded the marital home, subject to an equitable lien in 
favor of appellant of $34,000 payable under a number of conditions, including 
appellee cohabiting. Findings, Page 3, Par. 2g. 
6. The appellant was ordered to quit claim her interest in the real property to 
the appellee. Findings, Page 3, Par. 2h. 
7. On February 24, 1998, appellant recorded in the official records of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, a trust deed and trust deed note (the "trust deed") conveying in 
trust to her attorney, Randy S. Ludlow ("Ludlow"), her equitable interest in the 
marital property as payment of her owed attorney's fees. Partial Transcript, Page 
41:5-22. 
8- On November 7, 2000, in a minute entry denying appellee's motion to 
disqualify Ludlow for conflict of interest, the trial court ruled that Ludlow was 
entitled to have a lien on the real property and that the court would determine the 
priority of claims on appellant's equitable interest in the property at trial or during 
a future evidentiary hearing. Minute Entry, Case No. 954901350, dated 
November 7, 2000. 
9. A trial was conducted June 29, 2001, and the trial court issued its Findings 
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on October 5, 2001. The trial court found that appellant had filed to pay her child 
support obligations, Findings Page 6, Par. 4. The court also found that pursuant to 
Section 70A-9-318, Utah Code Ann., Ludlow had taken the trust deed subject to 
any claims or defenses against it. Findings, Page 9, Par. 9 . The Court then ruled 
that the past due support obligations were to be offset against appellant's equitable 
lien on the property, without regard to the priority of such claims in relation to 
Ludlow's attorney lien on appellant's equitable interest. Findings, Page 12, Par. 5. 
A final order from the trial was not entered. 
10. Appellee filed a Petition for Wrongful Lien Injunction on August 12, 2005, 
which on October 27, 2005, in a minute entry, the trial court denied on the grounds 
that the trust deed was not wrongful at the time it was entered into and recorded. 
Minute Entry, Case No. 954901350, dated October 27, 2005. 
11. On October 12, 2005, Appellee filed a Verified Motion for Contempt and 
for Order Appointing Clerk of Court to Release Trust Deed. 
11. On January 12, 2006, the court entered the Amended Decree, incorporating 
by reference the Findings and also entered the Order on Petitioner's Verified 
Motion for Contempt and for Order Appointing Clerk of Court to Release Trust 
Deed. 
12. A reconveyance deed wherein the Clerk of the Third District Court upon 
order of the court releases the trust deed was recorded in the official records of 
Salt Lake County on January 19, 2006. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY 
CONSIDER APPLICABLE UTAH LAW REGARDING THE PRIORITY 
OF EXISTING CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLANT'S EQUITABLE 
INTEREST IN THE MARITAL PROPERTY WHEN DETERMINING TO 
OFFSET PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS AGAINST SAID 
EQUITABLE INTEREST, 
The trial court failed to consider the appropriate Utah statutory provisions 
regarding the priority of liens against real property. In determining that it was 
appropriate to offset appellant's unpaid child support obligations against her 
equitable interest in the marital property, the trial court relied on Section 70A-9-
318, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), as support for the assertion that the 
appellant's attorney, Ludlow, had taken the trust deed subject to any claims or 
defenses against it. 
However, Title 70A, Chapter 9, which has been since repealed and 
replaced with Chapter 9a, is found within the Uniform Commercial Code and 
deals with secured transactions other than general real property secured 
transactions. Real property is covered in Title 57, Chapter 1, which covers 
conveyances of real property, including trust deeds. 
Under Section 57-3-103, Utah Code Ann. (2006), Utah is a "race-notice" 
jurisdiction with regard to its recording statute. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 904, 906 (fh2) (Utah 1986). 
What this means is that recorded property liens take precedence over unrecorded 
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or later recorded liens. In this instance, appellant conveyed a trust deed to 
Ludlow, in payment of her legal fees, which was recorded against the property on 
February 24, 1998. The trial court affirmed the validity of the trust deed in its 
October 27, 2005 minute entry where it denied that the appellee's petition for a 
wrongful lien injunction on the grounds that the trust deed conveyance was not 
wrongful at the time it was recorded. 
As a valid lien, the trust deed takes priority over unrecorded or later 
recorded liens against the property. However, what is at issue here are judgments 
for child support. Therefore to determine the priority of such judgments as against 
the trust deed, it is necessary to determine the date of each judgment, whether it 
occurred prior to or after the priority date of the trust deed, and whether such 
judgments constitute liens on real property based on the statutory requirements for 
creating such liens in effect on the date of the individual judgments. 
Each unpaid child support obligation payment becomes a judgment of the 
court against the party who has failed to pay on and after the due date. Section 78-
45-93, Utah Code Ann. (2006). After July 1, 1997, however, such judgments do 
not automatically become liens on real property. Section 78-22-1(2), Utah Code 
Ann. (2006). Prior to this date, it is sufficient merely that the judgment be entered 
by the district court. Judgments dated on or after July 1, 1997 become liens on 
real property only if the judgment is filed in the "Registry of Judgments of the 
office of the clerk of the district court of the county in which the property is 
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located." Section 78-22-1.5(2), Utah Code Ann. (2006). All judgments dated July 
1, 2002 and later become liens on real property only if recorded in the office of the 
county recorder for the county in which the property is located. Section 78-22-
l(7)(a), Utah Code Ann. (2006). 
In this case there are numerous individual child support judgments. Those 
judgments dated earlier than July 1, 1997, are liens on appellant's real property 
and take precedence over the trust deed. From July 1, 1997, each judgment that 
predates the recording date of the trust deed, February 24, 1998, and which was 
filed in the Registry of Judgments of the court clerk, are liens on the appellant's 
real property that take priority over the trust deed. All judgments occurring after 
this date are in position behind the trust deed, therefore the trust deed takes 
precedence over them in order of priority for payment. 
There are no provisions within Title 78, Chapter 45, the Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act (the "Act"), that specifically grant child support 
judgments automatic priority over all other claims against real property. In fact, 
the Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting the Public Support of Children Act, which 
was the predecessor to the Act, has stated that support liens "may attach to the 
parent's interest or equity in property without destroying traditional time-honored 
and well-established rules of property law which govern the priorities of various 
liens or claims. Thus, the . . . judgment lien, like other judgment liens, takes 
priority as of the time it is duly docketed or recorded." Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 
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390, 396 (Utah 1983). The Act includes no provisions indicating legislative intent 
to alter this interpretation of Utah law. Rather, Section 78-45-12, Utah Code Ann. 
(2006) of the Act, specifically states that "[t]he rights herein created are in 
addition to and not in substitution to any other rights." 
The trial court applied the wrong statutory provision and failed to 
adequately analyze the priority of claims against appellant's equitable interest in 
determining to offset the appellant's past due child support obligations against her 
equitable interest in the marital property. While the trial court was well within its 
discretion to make such a determination, any offsets must take into account all 
valid existing liens against the appellant's equitable interest. The appellant's 
conveyance of a trust deed on her equitable interest to satisfy her legal fees takes 
priority over those child support judgments that post date it, or which were not 
perfected as real property liens according to the statutory requirement in place on 
the individual judgment dates. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, appellant Heather T. Childs requests this 
Court to reverse the district court's order offsetting all past due child support 
against the appellant's equitable interest in the marital property, and reverse the 
trial court's order to reconvey the trust deed. Appellant further requests this Court 
to remand this matter to the trial court for detailed findings regarding the priority 
of the trust deed in relation to the child support judgments according to the 
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statutory provisions set forth above, and to order the trial court to record such 
documents necessary to restore the trust deed interest which appellant conveyed to 
Randy S. Ludlow to satisfy her attorney's fees 
Dated this ' \ day of November, 20j 
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EXHIBIT A 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSEL CHILDS, : AMENDED DECREE 
Petitioner 
v. : Civil No. 9549013 50 DA 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, : Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Respondent. : Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
THE TRIAL in this matter came on for hearing on the 29th day of June, 2001, at the hour 
of 9:00 a.m„ the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, District Court Judge, presiding. The Petitioner 
appeared in person and through his counsel, Harry Caston. The Respondent appeared in person 
and through her counsel, Randy Ludlow Witnesses were called on behalf of both parties after 
which the Court considered the arguments of counsel. The Court having considered the 
testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits received into evidence, having 
Amended Decree @J 
JD17775229 
954901350 CHILDS,HEATHER T 
FILED Bit, i ) U 
Third Judic\*: < * 
JAN i 2 260$ 
Deputy c»" 
considered the arguments of counsel, having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. That based upon the Respondent's cohabitation with Allan Morrical on or about 
June 1, 1997, the Petitioner's alimony obligation was terminated as of that date. 
2. That as of the date of trial, Respondent's obligation to the Petitioner was 
$21,978.54, consisting of: 
a. Child support of $6,587.90; 
b. The Respondent's share of the medical and dental insurance premiums that 
the Petitioner has maintained on behalf of the children in the amount of $4,296.58; 
c. The Respondent's share of the work-related day care in the amount of 
$5,845.06; 
d. The Respondent's share of uncovered medical expenses in the amount of 
$1,949.00; 
e. Attorney's fees of $4,000.00; 
f. A credit to the Respondent for alimony for the months of April and May 
1997. 
3. That since the trial of this matter the Respondent's obligations to the Petitioner are 
$2,617.91, consisting of: 
a. child support of $1,140.00; 
/O ^ ^ \ 
b. dental insurance of $88.38; 
c. medical insurance of $239.40; 
d. orthodontics for Patches of $ 1,170.00; 
e. interest of $16.13. 
These amounts are for the months of July, August, September, October, November and 
December 2001; a spread sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The orthodontics billing 
statement for the minor child Patches is attached hereto as Exhibit B, and the Respondent's 
amount owing, $1,170.00, is one half of the total bill. 
4. That the Respondent's total obligation to the Petitioner is $24,596.45. 
5. The off setting the Respondent's obligations of $24,596.45 against the Petitioner's 
obligation of $34,000.00, the Petitioner owes the Respondent the sum of $9,403.55. 
6. That the Petitioner shall also be entitled to deduct from the Respondent's equitable 
lien any unpaid child support, the Respondent's share of medical and dental insurance maintained 
on behalf of the children, and the Respondent's share of the children's medical and dental 
expenses that have accrued since the submission of this Order to the Court. 
7. As the Petitioner remarried on December 15, 2000, the Respondent's equitable 
lien is due and payable. 
8. All other claims asserted by Petitioner at trial are denied. 
3 
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9. The Comrn i s s i°n e r ' s Recommendation of September 12, 2001 is affirmed, and 
the Petitioner's Objections are denied. 
DATED this Ah— day of V f e ^ ~ ^ , 2 0 0 ^ . 
Approved as to form: 
TyroAe E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
Randy Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent %^-?h*MSr. er 
v«-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \^> day of December 2005 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE was sent via first class mail, postage pre-
paid to: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Randy Ludlow 
185 S. State St., #208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FAX 328-0173 
o\-z^\ 
EXHIBIT B 
HARRY CASTON (#4009) 
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1104 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT L A K £ COUXM V, b 1 A 1E OJb UTAH 
BRAD RUSSEL CHILDS, ' 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, ] 
Respondent. ' 
) ORDER ON PETITIONER'S VERIFIED 
> MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND FOR 
) ORDER APPOINTING CLERK OF 
) COURT TO RELEASE TRUST DEED 
> Case No. 954901350 
1 Judge Medley 
1 Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
On the 28 day of November 2005, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., came on to be heard the 
PETITIONER'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND FOR ORDER APPOINTING 
CLERK OF CuuRT TO RELEASE iRUS JT. the Honorable Domestic Relations Commissioner 
T. Patrick Casey presiding. The Petitioner appeared in person and through his attorney of record, 
Harry Caston. The Respondent appeared through her attorney of record Randy S. Ludlow. The 
Court having considered the arguments of counsel, and the pleadings that had been submitted, 
and good cause appearing does hereby ORDER. ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
1. In that the Order arising out of the hearing of February 23, 2005 provides that the 
1 
HIED DISTRICT COURT 
Tnird Judicial District 
JAN J 2 2006 
CuN r\ 
Deputy CJerk 
/ T i — ^ — " T 
Respondent's equitable lien is extinguished, and that Mr. Ludlow's lien is subordinate to the 
claim for additional accrued child-support and support-related expenses, and as the Respondent 
refuses to release the Trust Deed despite the Order arising out of the hearing of November 23, 
2005, it is appropriate and the Court does hereby ORDER and that the Clerk of the Court is 
APPOINTED to release the Trust Deed, which encumbers the former marital home, in favor of 
the Petitioner's attorney. 
2. The Respondent's contempt is certified to the Court for evidentiary hearing. 
ENTERED this day of 2005. 
Appioved as 10 form 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent 
BY^FHE. COURT: 
•^ N'^'T^Fd-Bistrict Commissioner 
/ 
> ' ) : V 
Tyrone E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
? 
i i 
O&yujJJ 
C o :• 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the c:?Y> day of December 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON PETITIONER'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND FOR 
ORDER APPOINTING CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE TRUST DEED, was delivered via 
U.S. Postal Service, first class pre paid mail, hand-delivery or facsimile to the following: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Randy Ludlow 
185 South State Street, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ON & HYDE 
EXHIBIT C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 954901350 
The trial in this matter came on for hearing on the 29th day 
of June, 2001, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, District Court Judge, presiding. The petitioner appeared 
in person and through his counsel, Harry Caston. The respondent 
appeared in person and through her counsel, Randy Ludlow. 
Witnesses were called on behalf of both parties after which the 
Court considered the arguments of counsel. The Court having 
considered the testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the 
exhibits received into evidence, and considered the arguments of 
counsel* does hereby find and conclude, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and respondent were divorced pursuant to a 
Decree of Divorce that was entered on March 21, 1997. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce: 
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a. The petitioner was awarded custody of the parties' 
three minor children, subject to the respondent's rights of 
visitation. 
b. The respondent was ordered to pay child support in 
the amount of $184 per month, commencing in the first month after 
entry of the Decree. 
c. The petitioner was ordered to maintain medical 
insurance on behalf of the parties1 minor children, with each of 
the parties to be responsible for one-half of the insurance premium 
attributable to the children. At the time of the Decree of Divorce 
one-half of the insurance premium attributable to the parties' 
minor children was $61.84 per month. 
d. The parties were ordered to be equally responsible 
for any uncovered medical, dental, orthodontic, optical and 
prescription costs attributable to the children that were not 
covered by insurance. 
e. The respondent was ordered to pay one-half of the 
work-related daycare that the petitioner incurred on behalf of the 
parties' minor children. The petitioner was ordered to submit to 
the respondent verification of the money that he paid for daycare 
within 10 days of receipt, and the respondent was obligated to 
reimburse the petitioner for one-half of the amount that the 
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petitioner paid within 10 days from the date she received 
verification from the petitioner. 
f. The respondent was awarded temporary alimony in the 
amount of $350 per month for a period of two years beginning the 
first month after entry of the Decree of Divorce. Alimony would 
terminate upon the earliest occurrence of a number of conditions, 
one of those conditions being the petitioner's establishment that 
the respondent is cohabiting. 
g. The petitioner was awarded the marital home, subject 
to the respondents equitable lien in the amount of $34,000, 
payable upon a number of conditions including the respondents 
cohabitation. 
h. The respondent was ordered to quit-claim her 
interest in the real property to the petitioner. 
3. The Court finds that from at least June 1, 1997 through 
June 20, 1998, the respondent was cohabiting with Allan Morrical. 
The basis of this finding is that: 
a. This Court has found that prior to the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce that the respondent had a sexual relationship 
with Allan Morrical. The Court further finds that respondent, 
based on her own testimony, had sexual relations with Allan 
Morrical between June 1, 1997, through June 20, 1998, according to 
her testimony not as many as ten times. 
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b. The Court finds that during trial Allan Morrical 
took the Fifth Amendment as to questions regarding his sexual 
relationship with respondent. Consequently, the Court draws an 
adverse inference from Mr. Morricalfs Fifth Amendment claim and 
finds that respondent and Allan Morrical had sexual relations 
during the relevant time period. 
c. That from June 1, 1997 through June 20, 1998, the 
respondent and Allan Morrical resided together first in Sandy, 
Utah, at 16611 E. Edgecliff Drive, then at 745 West 3585 South, 
Magna , Utah. 
d. In her deposition taken on July 23, 1997, and at 
trial, the respondent testified that Allan Morrical moved in with 
her sometime "after Memorial Day." The respondent also testified 
at her deposition and at trial that between January of 1997 until 
after Memorial Day, the only time Allan Morrical would have stayed 
overnight was when he was tending the respondent's children and 
that there were Mnot very many" occasions when Allan Morrical would 
have stayed overnight prior to his move into the residence in that 
the petitioner would not let the respondent Mhave my kids out at 
night unless it was my weekend." Respondent steadfastly alleges 
that she and Allan Morrical did not cohabitate. 
e. The Court finds that the respondent's testimony is 
contradicted by Allan Morrical1s testimony wherein the Court finds 
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he admitted that he first resided with respondent "once in Sandy," 
"once in Magna." Allan Morricalfs general testimony regarding the 
issue of residency is not believable and lacks credibility in that 
he could not recall when he resided with respondent, when he moved 
from the Sandy City location and couldnft recall what city he moved 
to when they left Sandy. Based upon the evasive nature of his 
testimony, the Court draws the reasonable inference that they 
resided together during the relevant time periods. 
f. The respondents conflicting testimony that Allan 
Morrical did not reside with her is also contradicted by the 
observations of the petitioner who testified that frequently when 
he would pick up the children he would observe Allan Morrical's 
truck and patrol vehicle at the residence. That frequently when 
the respondent picked up the children, the respondent was usually 
with Allan Morrical in his patrol car, or would utilize Allan 
Morricalfs truck. Additional indicia of cohabitation include: 
Allan Morrical, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, kept his guns at 
the residences; he helped pay respondent's rent shortages; he 
regularly provided transportation for respondent and her children; 
his laundry was cleaned at the Magna residence; Allan Morrical 
would provide care for respondent's children when she had to work 
a graveyard shift; and finally, on June 20, 1998, Allan Morrical 
and respondent, while residing at the residence in Magna, were 
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involved in an incident of domestic violence where the police were 
called. However, conveniently and incredibly, while testifying at 
trial, Allan Morrical could not recall any of the events of the 
domestic violence incident. 
g. The Court's previous determination that the 
respondent and Allan Morrical had engaged in a sexual relationship 
and respondent's testimony at trial that she had sexual relations 
with Allan Morrical after the entry of the Decree, taken together 
with the respondent and Allan Morrical residing together in a 
residence, then moving together to a new residence, and their close 
relationship and companionship, sharing of vehicles, all support a 
finding of cohabitation. 
4. The Court finds that with the exception of $3,234.19 
which was garnished by the Office of Recovery Services, that the 
respondent has failed and refused to pay any child support, and 
that at the time of trial the child support arrearage from April, 
1997, through and including June, 2001, equals $9,822.09, which 
consists of principal of $9,384 and interest in the amount of 
$438.09. After subtracting the amount collected by the Office of 
Recovery Services, the respondent has a child support arrearage of 
$6,587.90. 
5. The Court finds that the respondent refused and failed to 
reimburse the petitioner for her share of the medical and dental 
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insurance premium that the petitioner has maintained on behalf of 
the children, and that from April, 1997, to and including June, 
2001, the arrearage for the respondent's share of the medical 
insurance premium equals $3,163.81, consisting of principal of 
$2,942.40, and interest of $221.41; and dental insurance of 
$1,132.77, consisting of principal in the amount of $1,053.42, and 
interest of $79.35. 
6. The Court finds that the respondent refused and failed to 
pay her one-half share of the childrenfs uncovered medical costs. 
The Court finds that the respondent's share of these costs equals 
$1,949. 
7. The Court finds that the respondent failed and refused to 
pay her share of the cost of work-related daycare paid for by the 
petitioner, and that from April, 1997, through and including June, 
2001, the respondent's arrearage equals $11,690.12, consisting of 
an unpaid principal of $10,207.50, and interest in the amount of 
$1,482.62. The Court further finds, however, that in part 
petitioner failed to timely provide verification of expenditures 
for work-related daycare to respondent. Consequently, petitioner 
is entitled to recover only one-half of respondent's arrearage 
total (one-half of $11,690.12). 
8. The respondent contends that she did not pay her share of 
the children's uncovered medical expenses and did not reimburse the 
**C —1 
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petitioner one-half of the work-related daycare expenses that were 
incurred in that she did not receive verification of these 
expenditures. The Court rejects this testimony in part, in that: 
a. The petitioner presented the Court with copies of 
verification of expenses that the petitioner presented to the 
respondent, some of which were untimely, that the respondent then 
failed to pay. 
b. The Court finds that the respondent has had no 
intention of paying child support or any support-related 
obligations. The respondent testified at her deposition and at 
trial that it was her understanding that she did not have to pay 
child support during the time that her appeal was pending, yet the 
respondent failed to voluntarily pay child support or any other 
support-related obligation even after her appeals were dismissed. 
c. The respondent testified at her deposition and at 
trial that she did receive verification of child care expenses, but 
that she had no intention of paying her share as she did not 
approve of the daycare provider that the petitioner had chosen. 
d. The respondent testified that another of the reasons 
why she did not pay her support-related obligations was that the 
petitioner failed to pay his alimony obligation. The Court has 
found that due to the respondent's cohabitation with Allan 
Morrical, that the petitioner did not have an alimony obligation. 
^ ^ K 1 
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Furthermore, the Court finds that te respondent's excuse is flawed 
in that the petitioner inquired as to whether the respondent wished 
to offset obligations or whether the respondent wished for the 
parties to exchange checks each month, and that the respondent did 
not respond to these inquiries. 
9. The respondent claims that the equitable lien cannot be 
altered or offset against the obligations that she owes to the 
petitioner as she has assigned her equitable lien to her attorney. 
The Court finds that pursuant to Section 70A-9-318, Utah Code Ann., 
the respondent's attorney, the assignee of the equitable lien, 
takes the equitable lien subject to any claims or defense against 
it. The Court also finds that the respondent's attorney has had 
notice of the petitioner's claim of offset. 
10. The Court also retains the jurisdiction over this case 
and all issues thereto sufficient to grant the petitioner a 
Judgment due to the respondent's failure and refusal to pay support 
and her support-related obligations, and the jurisdiction to allow 
the petitioner to offset this Judgment against the respondent's 
equitable lien. 
11. The Court finds that the petitioner remarried on the 15th 
day of December, 2000. 
12. The Court finds that the respondent has acted in bad 
faith in that: 
^A & 
CHILDS V. CHILDS PAGE 10 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
a. The respondent maintains that she and Allan Morrical 
did not have a sexual relationship. 
b. The respondent has voluntarily failed and refused to 
pay any support-related obligation. 
c. The respondent's assertion that she did not have to 
pay support while her appeals were pending is not supported by the 
law. 
d. The respondent's assertion that she did not have to 
pay work-related daycare as she did not approve of the provider 
masks the respondent's anger and her intention, consistent with her 
practice, not to pay any support or support-related obligations. 
e. The respondent refused to cooperate with the 
petitioner in any way during the pendency of this action, having 
refused to respond to the petitioner's requests as to whether the 
respondent preferred for the parties to exchange checks or whether 
the respondent, whose support obligation was greater than the 
petitioner's alimony obligation, preferred to provide a check to 
the petitioner, and in presenting an argument that the Court cannot 
offset her support obligations against her equitable lien, which in 
essence seeks to further deprive the parties' children of the 
support that the respondent has refused to pay. 
13. The Court finds that the petitioner's reasonable 
attorney's fees in bringing this matter before the Court are 
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$8,733.03, that despite respondent's limited resources, she should 
contribute towards petitioner's legal fees by way of setoff in the 
amount of $4,000. 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that as the respondent was cohabiting 
with Allan Morrical on or about June 1, 1997, the petitioner's 
alimony obligation was terminated as of that date. 
2. The Court concludes that the total of the respondent's 
obligation to the petitioner equals $21,978.54, consisting of: 
a. Child support of $6,587.90. 
b. The respondent's share of the medical and dental 
insurance premiums that the petitioner has maintained on behalf of 
the children in the amount of $4,296.58. 
c. The respondent's share of work-related daycare in 
the amount of $5,845.06. 
d. The respondent's share of uncovered medical expenses 
in the amount of $1,949. 
e. That the attorney's fees incurred in part by 
petitioner were directly caused by the bad faith actions of the 
respondent, therefore, in consideration of respondent's limited 
s~A I 
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resources she shall be responsible for petitioner's reasonably 
incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $4,000. 
f. Respondent is further credited the sum of $700 for 
alimony for the months of April and May, 1997. 
3. That as the petitioner remarried December 15, 2000, the 
respondent's equitable lien is due and payable. 
4. The Court does retain jurisdiction over all of the issues 
attendant to this case, including the respondent's equitable lien, 
and does have the jurisdiction and ability to offset the 
respondent's obligations to the petitioner against the equitable 
lien. 
5. The Court does hereby offset the obligation that the 
respondent owes to the petitioner in the amount of $21,978.54 
against the respondent's equitable lien of $34,000. Furthermore, 
respondent's obligation to petitioner shall be augmented by any 
reasonable arrearages for child support, medical and dental 
insurance premiums, child care and uncovered medical expenses 
incurred since the date of trial upon written verification. All 
other claims asserted by petitioner at trial are denied. 
6. The Commissioner's Recommendation of September 12, 2001, 
is affirmed, and petitioner's Objections are denied. 
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7. Counsel for petitioner is instructed to prepare an 
Amended Decree consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 4-504(2). 
Dated this 
_day of October ,/2001. 
IE E. MEDLE 
IICT COURT 
—*TK> ""£ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this day of October, 2001: 
Harry Caston 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent 
320 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
EXHIBIT D 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Is that March of this year? 
Yes, sir. 
Now would you — just a moment, your Honor. 
(Counsel has exhibit marked with court clerk) 
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Q. BY MR. LUDLOW: In regards to Exhibits No. 5 and 6, 
would you please identify those? 
A. Number 5 is a trust deed, and No. 6 is the trust deed 
note. 
Q. What were those for? 
A. For me giving permission that the lien — I guess more 
or less me actually put a lien on my equity of the house. This 
has been so long ago. 
Q. In fact, those — you gave those with the intent to have 
your then attorney's fees and accruing attorney's fees paid from 
that particular lien; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you owe attorney's fees up through this time 
period? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And approximately how much? 
A. To guess, anywhere from I would say 20 to probably 
$30,000. That's just guessing. I don't know. 
Q. Have you been paid out any of your monies since 
Mr. Childs has remarried? 
A. No, sir. 
EXHIBIT E 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER T CHILDS, 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 954901350 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Date: 11/07/2000 
Clerk: daleeng 
The Respondent's "Motion in Limine or in the Alternative to 
Continue Trial" and the Petitioner's "Motion for Disqualification 
of Respondent's Attorney" have both come before this Court pursuant 
to Rule 4-501. Since the bench trial has been continued without 
date, the Court will reserve ruling on the "Motion in Limine" until 
the case is reset for trial. The Petitioner's "Motion for 
Disqualification" is DENIED. UCA 78-51-41 allows the Respondent's 
counsel to have a lien on the real property. Furthermore, the 
Respondent's counsel has submitted an affidavit stating he does not 
believe his representation will be adversely affected by his 
interest in the lien. Finally, the Respondent also submitted an 
affidavit stating she has consented to her attoney's continued 
representation after consultation. Also, this Court will resolve 
the issue of priority, by adjusting the lien according to the 
competing interests, at trial or during a future evidentiary 
hearing. This Minute Entry will constitute the f.inal Order of the 
Court. 
"J'ffvus t 
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
r ' ? T r > p q v 
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Case No: 954901350 
Date: Nov 07, 2000 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 954901350 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail HARRY CASTON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
9 Exchange Place 
Suite 810 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail RANDY S LUDLOW 
ATTORNEY DEF 
33 6 SOUTH 3 00 EAST 
SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841110000 
Dated this ^ day of \U r>>. , 20<^ . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
EXHIBIT F 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, : MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 954901350 
vs. : 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, : 
Respondent. : 
Petitioner's Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction has been 
submitted to the Court for decision in accordance with Utah Code Ann., 
Section 38-9a-202. After further review and consideration, the Court 
rules as follows. 
1 Petitioner's Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction is 
denied. It should be noted that the Court conducted a telephone status 
conference with counsel for the parties on September 21, 2005, wherein 
Mr. Ludlow indicated he would not file a response to the Petition. 
Having reviewed the history of this case, the Court denies petitioner's 
current Petition because the Court cannot find that the Trust Deed was 
wrongful when filed. Additionally, based upon the ex parte nature of 
this proceeding (see, Utah Code Ann., Section 38-9a-202(3)), and the 
Court's reading of the Wrongful Lien statute, the alternative relief 
sought by petitioner is unavailable under the Wrongful Lien statute. 
w r*i I 
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2 This signed Minute Entry shall constitute the Order of the 
Court resolving the matter referenced herein. 
Dated this /% / day of October,/S005. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this day of 
October, 2005: 
Harry Caston 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent 
185 S. State Street, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT G 
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TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ?7HL... day of January ^
 i g 9 8 _ 
between ifeather.T.. . .Childs _ 
., , as TRUSTOR, 
. whose address is 75.?A.W®j?.tL!^£.i?£A^^ 
7 ~ J (Stwet mnd number) (City) (State) 
in 
to ~ - ~ 
I > Jergld_D.,.„McPh9e _ _
 a s TRUSTEE,* and 
oc 
CO _ _ _ ^ _ 
K ^ & . S . Ludlojf , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in S a l t .Lake 
County, State of Utah: 
A l l o f Lot 408 HOMESTEAD ESTATES NO. 4 SUBDIVISION, according t o 
the o f f i c i a l p l a t thereof a s recorded i n t h e o f f i c e of the 
S a l t Lake County Recorder, more commonly knovm a s 13725 South 
Front i er S t r e e t , R iver ton , Utah. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (I) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory ~? 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums w 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest UD 
thereon as herein provided. 2 ? 
CD 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings ^ ^ 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah, a corporation authorired to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. O 
vo 
C D 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair, not to remove or demolish any building thereon, to 
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, 
damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not 
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state-
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of 
the property damaged, 
3. To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to ail compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and oth-er insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance oi any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in gerson, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of leneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as Q J 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any otiter Z^z 
or subsequent default. ~ . 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here- CX> 
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due r-r* 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee ^ ^ 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations *-0 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or *""U 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing CT3 
expenditures secured hereby. £ 3 
15. After the lapse of such time as may then be Required by law following the recordation of said notice of 
default, and notice of default and notice of sal« having peen given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it m£v determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any ca**se he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
tKereat V*y swcH pe*scn\ at the Usut axvd tilac^ last a^P oitvted. for the sale; provided, if U\e sale is pc^tpotved 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee ^hajl execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses ot exercising the power of sale ana of the 3*1 e, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at KK'c per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, rnay deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitied to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee a t any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18, This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is hot obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
t r u s t Deed ot oi uxvy action OT ptoce*&\s*g Vn -WkwAv *V*\«t««f Bemticvatfy, or Trustee shall be a party^ unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20, This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21, The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of Bale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
SlAiklfliiiLl£_ 
(U Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 8S-
On the 27£& day of . ..^artuarY.. AX>. 19..98.., personally 
appeared before me Heather.Xt.J^M?..... , . «.>-v.,~-~^-™... 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged txTme that -§h*A executed the 
same, / /? _ / ,/ /// / / / 
M) 
MOTAHY P U B U C 
LooJJo ChristrjfTanson 
East, #200! 
cft^orwttt 
% Commission Expin* 
M m * 13,2001 
mumwvmi (If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ss* 
On the day of - •--, A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me -;- ---• -..,-who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of
 : -— » 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and tha t said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-tews (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said - acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public residing a t : 
My Commission Expires: 
Q 3 
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EXHIBIT H 
When Recorded Return To: 
Harry Caston 
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE 
9 Exchange Place 
Suite 1104, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City Utah, 84111 
Phone: 801-531-7444 
Fax: 801-531-8885 
01/19/2006 04:06 Pfl * 1 2 - Q» 
Book - 9245 Ps •- 4936-4537 
GARY trf. O T T 
FECfMER, SHIT LAKE OBUNTY, UP-
3K0RM6 CASTON HAMILTON * HYDE 
9 EXCHANGE PL S'lE i?04 
3LC U7 84111 
8 r : Z-3M, DEPUTY - » I 2 P. 
Space above for County Recorder's Use 
[PARCEL I.D. # 33 04 281 002] 
DEED OF RECONVEYANCE 
The Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, having been ordered 
by the Court to sign the Deed of Reconveyance as Successor Trustee, releasing the Trust Deed 
dated January 27,1998, with Heather T. Childs, as Trustor, and Randy S. Ludlow, as 
Beneficiary, and recorded February 24, 1998, as Entry No. 6872651 in Book 7889 at Page 109 of 
the Official Records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County Utah, pursuant to the Order of 
the Third Judicial District Court, does hereby reconvey, without warranty, to Brad Childs, the 
real property situated in Salt Lake County Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
All of 408 HOMESTEAD ESTATES NO. 4 SUBDIVISION, 
according to the official plat thereof as recorded in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, more commonly known as 13727 
South Frontier Street, Riverton ,Utah. 
DATED this Q day oC$c 
_, 2 0 0 . ^ . 
?lerk of the Third Judicial District Court 
^^^"'--sg^rving As Successor Trustee pursuant to Order 
j^&ys-V&jiCtkc Third Judicial District Court 
BK 9245 PG 4936 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The foregoing DEED OF RECONVEYANCE was acknowledged before me this e f re i    I 
day of H g . T B ^ A , 200j£, by 
y.kkjlj^^fi^y, $;<jr:r*i\i..,J: . \ 
NOTARY PUBLIC* D: to%:;;'iW- ' '< • 
Residing at: <;.- \ '/l.;-'.^. •',, / / 
My Commission Expires: XJ \<?'v*f V 
BK 9245 PG 4937 
